Hardware Roots of Trust, Remote Attestation and Trusted Execution
Two intensive days, 16 hours, aligned with the Oxford course
or email hello@kuc.uk · Download the flyer (PDF)
TPM 2.0 · SRTM/DRTM · Measured boot · Remote attestation · Sealing · TEE · SGX/TDX · TrustZone · Confidential VMs · TCB minimisation · Security by design
Informal evening talks on trusted execution environments, remote attestation and confidential computing.
Why this training
Every modern platform ships a root of trust: a TPM, a CPU enclave, a secure monitor, a confidential virtual machine. Few engineers can say what those components actually guarantee, how to prove a remote machine is in a known state, and where the trust chain breaks.
This course closes that gap. It is aligned with the Trusted Computing Infrastructures curriculum taught at the University of Oxford, condensed into two intensive days for practitioners, with worked examples from real platforms instead of vendor marketing.
One course, two full days (09:00–17:00, 16 hours), aligned with the thirteen lectures of the Oxford course.
Trust basics and definitions, chains and roots of trust, the trusted platform (elements, threats, use cases), TPM 2.0 (keys, seeds, sealing, binding, authorisation policies), static and dynamic roots of trust for measurement (SRTM, DRTM, Intel TXT), trusted, measured and verified boot, measurement logs and PCRs, local and remote attestation, attestation identity keys and privacy, provisioning.
Trusted execution environments as reference monitors and TCB minimisation, hardware isolation and rings, malware and rootkit resistance, Intel SGX enclaves (memory protection, keys, attestation, TCB recovery, Boot Guard), Arm TrustZone, virtualisation and guest attestation, a brief look at confidential virtual machines (Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, Arm CCA), device ownership, integrity measurement, applications (disk encryption), and the language of trust: what an attestation can and cannot tell you.
Flyer
Two pages: why this training, the programme, your instructor and the course details. Easy to share with your team or your manager.
As printed on the certificate, the course covers:
Engineers and decision-makers who build on, buy or audit trusted hardware:
Prerequisites: working knowledge of operating systems and computer architecture. No prior trusted-computing experience required.
Dr Küçük holds a DPhil in Computer Science from the University of Oxford and has taught at Oxford, including Trusted Computing Infrastructures. Received PhD funding from Intel Corporation for SGX/TEE research.
He defined the Confidential Remote Computing paradigm in his Oxford doctoral research and released it openly for anyone to build on: doi:10.5287/ora-2rovaxbjd.
Software engineer and security architect. Completed two Innosuisse projects at ETH Zürich, where he was previously affiliated with ETH D-INFK and ETH D-MAVT.
Published researcher and speaker at Black Hat Europe and DEF CON; adviser to industry on trusted hardware, attestation and confidential computing.
Bring trusted computing and confidential computing into your team now and apply it in your next product.
Participant feedback
Senior engineer
“I have never had a lecture on TEEs and SGX without a single technical word, only everyday analogies. I enjoyed it so much and understood everything. I am still surprised such complex concepts can be explained in plain language, without jargon.”
Course participant
“The course is like a roller coaster: sometimes super technical, sometimes everyday examples from daily life. Very practical and very relevant to today’s issues. It lit up many dark areas I never understood in systems, security, networking and software. A very powerful intersection of them all.”
Senior security architect
“I could not understand how keys can be generated inside an enclave at all. When the depth of the concept finally clicked, I was honestly shocked. I learned so much about key management and binding keys to software identity during execution, and those concepts got me a new job at ABB.”
Course participant
“I came in insecure and not confident at all, and left confident and knowledgeable. The teacher makes sure every detail is covered and notices quickly when someone has not understood something. I never expected to understand these advanced topics, and I am very happy that I did.”
Corporate client
“We were very lucky to get a spot. This content is otherwise only taught in Oxford’s master’s programme in computer science, which would cost a fortune. This course brings it directly to our company.”
The first company to receive Confidential Remote Computing certification outside academia.
On their CTO and Blockchain Lead completing the course
“An invaluable experience for our team.”
